Smartphones, the devices we carry everywhere with us, are being heavily tracked and have undoubtedly become a major threat to our privacy. As "Tracking the trackers" has become a necessity, various static and dynamic analysis tools have been developed in the past. However, today, we still lack suitable tools to detect, measure and compare the ongoing tracking across mobile OSs. To this end, we propose MobileAppScrutinator, based on a simple yet efficient dynamic analysis approach. To demonstrate the current trend in tracking, we select 140 most representative apps available on both Android and iOS AppStores and test them with MobileAppScrutinator. In fact, choosing the same set of apps on both Android and iOS also enables us to compare the ongoing tracking on these two OSs. Finally, we also discuss the effectiveness of privacy safeguards available on Android and iOS. We show that neither Android nor iOS privacy safeguards in their present state are completely satisfying.
INTRODUCTION
Smartphones no longer involve only the user and the communication service (GSM/CDMA) provider. The revolution of the AppStore model for application distribution brings a large number of new actors. In the literature, service providers to whom the user directly interacts with are considered as first-party, the user being the second-party. However, there are many additional actors whose services are not directly used by the end user, and whose presence is not obvious to most users, are called the third-parties. Third parties are, for example, Advertisers and Analytics (A&A) companies, application performance monitors, crash reporters, or push notification senders. The situation has become even more complex with the development of new advertisement models like Mobile Ad Networks or Ad exchange networks for real-time bidding (RTB).
Depending on the service provided, a user may accept to exchange data with a first-party, in general following legal terms and conditions upon which they mutually agree. However, the data collection by third-parties without explicit user consent is more problematic. Due to economic reasons, the A&A companies are the dominant third parties and the most privacy intrusive. Indeed, in order to increase their revenue, advertisers want to send personalized Ads to the user. Therefore A&A companies are incited to collect as much information as possible to better profile user's interests and behavior. In order to achieve this goal, they need a way to identify the smartphone/user via an identifier that can uniquely be associated with a smartphone/user. This whole process of data collection is called "third-party smartphone tracking" or simply "tracking" and the process of showing user-specific Ads based on user profile is called "targeted advertising".
Smartphone tracking and targeted-advertising are acceptable if the user is aware of it and if he agrees to receive targeted Ads based on his personal interests. Some users could also find the presence of third-parties on the smartphone beneficial. However, problems arise when A&A companies collect Personally-Identifiable Information (PII) without users' knowledge. In fact, Ad libraries sometimes also include APIs through which an application can deliberately leak user PII [1] . This creates serious privacy risks for users. With the rapidly growing number of smartphones, people are increasingly exposed to such risks. Moreover, a smartphone is particularly intrusive, revealing all user movements as it is equipped with many sensors, and it stores a plethora of information either generated by these sensors, by the telephony services (calls and SMS), or by the user himself (e.g., calendar events and reminders). Finally, various scandals in the past (e.g., [2, 3] ) make it difficult to trust all these actors present on smartphones.
Motivation.
As "Tracking these trackers" has become a necessity, various tools have been developed in the past. These tools are based on either static analysis or dynamic analysis or interception of network traffic. Even though static analysis techniques scale well, they generally fail on obfuscated applications and therefore, are not suited to accurately detect and measure the ongoing tracking. Similarly, network interception is often unable to handle SSL traffic. Dynamic analysis techniques for detection and measurement of PII leaks are available on Android but not on iOS. As we lack suitable dynamic analysis tools readily available on both Android and iOS, there is no measurement study in the literature which provides concrete evidence of ongoing tracking as well as the comparision across mobile OSs.
Contributions.
The contributions of this paper are threefold:
1. We present our dynamic analysis platform, MobileAppScrutinator, which detects and measure the ongoing tracking on Android and iOS. It is the first dynamic analysis platform for iOS to detect private data leakage.
2. We detect private information leaks by applications over the Internet, when they leak it in clear-text or over SSL. MobileScrutinator detects the PII leakage even if the App obfuscates the data (by hashing or encrypting) before sending over the network in clear-text or through SSL. Detection of modified PII is a key for reliable measurements as some identifiers (e.g., WiFi MAC address, AndroidID, IMEI) are often modified before being sent.
3. We test 140 popular applications with MobileAppScrutinator, on both Android and iOS, and report our findings with a comparision of ongoing tracking on these two platforms.
4. Finally, we discuss the effectiveness of privacy safeguards available on both Android and iOS. We show that neither Android nor iOS privacy safeguards in their present state are completely satisfying.
RELATED WORK
Our work can be compared with existing works on two axes: 1) Tracking measurement technology/tools and 2) Measurement of PII leakage. Below we discuss and compare our work with some most representative works along these two axes.
Tracking measurement technology
Tools to measure the ongoing tracking might be based on either interception of generated network traffic, or static analysis of the application code, or dynamic analysis of applications.
Interception of generated network traffic.
This approach is based on snooping the network data using Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) proxy. For example, MobileScope [4] , based on MITM proxy, was used in WSJ study [2] to investigate the top 100 applications on both Android and iOS. However, this technique cannot be used to intercept the SSL traffic which seriously limits the effectiveness of this approach; as we see in Sections 5 and 6 that almost half of PII leakage is through SSL. Additionally, MITM approach will not be able to detect reliably the leakage of PII generated by the system (values not known to the user and therefore, could not be searched in the network traffic). This includes different PII, for example, unique IDs generated and shared by applications and user location. Also, MITM based approach would fail in cases where user PII is modified (e.g., hashed or encrypted) before being sent (and, as we will show, this is a rather common practice). Finally, being a network packet analysis approach, it is not always easy or feasible to identify the application having generated the monitored traffic, which makes the (manual) analysis even more complex. MobileAppScrutinator, in contrast, makes analysis directly at the operating system level, and thus does not suffer from such limitations.
Static analysis.
Past works (PiOS [5] on iOS, FlowDroid [6] , ScanDroid [7] , CHEX [8] , AndroidLeaks [9] , SymDroid [10] , ScanDal [11] and AppIntent [12] on Android) are based on static analysis to detecte a flow of data from a PII source to a network sink. These works can be classified in two categories: 1) static tainting-based (e.g., FlowDroid [6] , ScanDroid [7] , CHEX [8] , AndroidLeaks [9] ) and 2) symbolic execution based (e.g., SymDroid [10] , ScanDal [11] and AppIntent [12] ). Among the ones based on symbolic execution, SymDroid [10] designs a symbolic executor based on their simple version of Dalvik VM, i.e., micro-dalvik. Similarly, ScanDal [11] designs an intermediate language, called Dalvik Core, and collects all the program states during the execution of the program for all inputs. Considering the Android's special eventdriven paradigm, AppIntent [12] proposes a more efficient event-space constraint guided symbolic execution. On iOS, PiOS was designed for binaries compiled with GCC/G++ compiler and since then, Apple switched to LLVM compiler. Therefore, PiOS needs to be adapted to support the analysis of binaries compiled with LLVM. Furthermore, PiOS is not available publicly, so one needs to build it from scratch to use it to detect and measure the ongoing tracking. In general, static analysis techniques do scale well but they lack dynamic information tracking and therefore, lead to false negatives.
Dynamic analysis.
TaintDroid [13] and PMP [14] are based on dynamic analysis on Android and iOS respectively. On Android, TaintDroid is a dynamic taint-based technique to detect and measure private data leakage. However, TaintDroid has its own limitations: 1) taint-based tracking can be easily circumvented using indirect information flows [15] 2) requires to make a trade-off between false positives and false negatives ( [13] did not taint IMSI due to false positives) 3) misses native code (both for taint propagation and as a source of information). On iOS, PMP [14] is a dynamic/runtime tool that offers the functionality of choosing access to what information a user is willing to share with a particular application. As iOS's own privacy control feature provides the same functionality, PMP [14] is an enhancement in terms of the number of different types of private data considered. In fact, PMP fails to notify users if the accessed information is being sent to a remote server or not. As existing dynamic analysis tools on iOS are not sufficient to measure the ongoing tracking on iOS, one possibility could have been a taint-based dynamic analysis technique. However, this is not possible to do on iOS device because the code of applications is native (C, C++ and Objective-C). Propagating taint would require to emulate native code, which involves serious changes to the system and would have a significant performance penalty. Therefore, we opted for a dynamic analysis approach, described in the next section, which can be used on both Android and iOS. To measure the effectiveness of MobileAppScrutinator on Android with TaintDroid, we perform tests on identical set of applications using TaintDroid and MobileAppScrutinator. We found that MobileAppScrutinator could detect a lot more PII leakage than TaintDroid.
Measurement of PII leakage
To best of our knowledge, no previous work provides a complete picture of tracking on Android and iOS. Webbrowser tracking has been thoroughly studied [16, 17] , but it is not the case with smartphone tracking. We are first to provide detailed analysis and measurement data for both Android and iOS. [18] sheds some light on third-party tracking being taken place on Android using TaintDroid but is not as comprehensive as ours. Also, all other static and dynamic analysis tools proposed in the literature, for example, PiOS [5] and TaintDroid [13] , analyzed some applications and presented a number of applications leaking user PII, but none of them presented a complete analysis as we do in Section 5 and 6. Also, as tracking technologies rapidly change with OS revisions, it is crucial to have up-to-date tools and a recent picture of tracking technology. Furthermore, we also consider the remote servers where PII is sent and attempted to distinguish them among first and third-parties, with the available information.
MOBILEAPPSCRUTINATOR

Design choices.
From tracking detection and measurement point of view, it is ideal to analyse what applications are doing at operating system level. However, we want to have a system that does not require too intrusive modifications of the OSs and does not have too many false positives (unlike dynamic taintingbased techniques). The system should work well with nonmalicious application on real devices so that it can be used by anyone. Thus the design of MobileAppScrutinator starts with a simple approach: intercepting the source, sink and data manipulation system APIs. As the same approach is applied to both Android and iOS, it enables us to compare the tracking across mobile OSs. Even though MobileAppScrutinator is based on this same simple approach on both Android and iOS, i.e., the basic governing philosophy remains the same, its implementation differs significantly due to the differences of these OSs.
Overall architecture.
As developer APIs are public on both Android and iOS, we are able to identify all source and sink methods (i.e., methods related to access or modification of private data along with network operations either in clear-text or encrypted). MobileAppScrutinator hooks these APIs and includes extra code to these APIs. This added extra code collects various information from the application environment. Specifically, it collects information about PII being accessed, modified, or transmitted by an application along with the information about that application. Any access, or modification, or transmission of PII corresponds to an event and is stored locally in an SQLite database. This database is later analyzed automatically to detect and measure privacy leaks.
In the next two subsections, we give details of how Mo- bileAppScrutinator is implemented on Android and iOS.
Implementation on Android
As the Android source (from Android Open Source Project (AOSP)) is publicly available, MobileAppScrutinator directly modifies source code of various APIs in Java frameworks. This modified source is compiled and a new system image is generated. We develop and add a system application to this new system image. This system application runs two Android services that are responsible for receiving data from different sources. The App is also responsible for storage of data in a local SQLite database.
As described earlier, our added extra code must send data to MobileAppScrutinator system app. To do so, we use two methods: AIDL 1 and socket APIs of libc library. Our extra coded added in Android application frameworks APIs uses AIDL to send data to MobileAppScrutinator system app whereas socket APIs of libc library are used in modified core Java frameworks. Here it is to be noted that Android application frameworks are written utilizing core Java frameworks, i.e., during compilation of Android source, core Java frameworks are compiled before the Android application frameworks. As AIDL is part of the Android application framework, the code added (by MobileAppScrutinator) in modified core Java frameworks cannot use AIDL to send data to MobileAppScrutinator system application. Therefore, to send data to MobileAppScrutinator system apps from modified APIs of core Java frameworks, MobileAppScrutinator uses socket APIs of libc library. to send data to a dedicated service running inside MobileAppScrutinator system application. Fig. 1 provides a broad picture of how MobileAppScrutinator is implemented on Android OS. code and the daemon is through mach messages. In order to execute self-signed code and get privileged access to the system, the default iOS software stack needs to be modified to remove the restrictions imposed by Apple (a technique known as "Jailbreaking" in the iOS world).
Implementation on iOS
On iOS, developers may write code in C, C++ and Objective-C languages. In fact, all iOS executables are linked with the Objective-C runtime [19] and this runtime environment provides a method called method setImplementation. We use this method to change the implementation of existing Objective-C methods whereas to change the implementation of C/C++ functions, we use the trampoline technique [20] . MobileSubstrate [21] , an open-source framework, greatly simplifies this task. Finally, the source code responsible for modification of various APIs of interest is compiled into a dynamic library (dylib) which is loaded using launchd [22], into all or a subset of running processes. Fig. 2b depicts how a dylib is loaded into a process using launchd.
Post-analysis of SQLite Data
The events stored in local SQLite database are processed by automated Python scripts. It is a two-step process: a first pass over the database on a per-application basis results into a JSON file, and a second pass over the JSON file derives various statistics.
Our first level analysis consists of the following steps:
1. Find all types of PII accessed by each application.
2. Check if PII is really sent over the network or not, and if yes, to which server it is sent to.
3. Search for the PII in the input to data modification APIs (cryptographic and hashing) and if found, look for the result in the data sent over the network.
First-level analysis results into a JSON file that stores 1) accessed PII, 2) PII passed to encryption or hash APIs 3) (un)modified PII sent over the Internet in cleartext or using SSL. Once the first pass over the database is finished, the resulted JSON file containing per-App details is processed to infer or derive various statistics. Here it is worth to mention that various PII accessed by an application are searched only in the network traffic and hash/cryptographic calls of that specific application.
In various APIs, the access to data is at byte level and in this case, the raw bytes are first attempted to be decoded using UTF-8 encoding. Since a different encoding may be used or in case of binary data, the hexadecimal representation of these raw bytes is also stored alongside. Searching in the network, or in the input to cryptographic or hash APIs is done for both UTF-8 encoded data and hexadecimal representation of the raw bytes.
Limitations
The PII leakage would remain undetected if the data is modified by the application developer using custom data modification functions before sending it over the network. If the PII is modified using OS provided data modification APIs (e.g., encryption, hashing) before sending over network, MobileAppScrutinator would correctly be able to detect the PII leakage. As an App developer is not bound to use system provided hash and encryption APIs, MobileAppScrutinator might miss some PII leakage instances.
In addition to this, the current AppScrutinator implementation on Android only supports the Java code. Therefore it currently does not detect PII leakage that involves calls to C/C++ APIs using the JNI framework. However, this is not a limitation of the approach and MobileAppScrutinator could easily be extended to handle such cases. handle JNI calls.
EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In order to investigate the tracking mechanisms being used by third-parties, we test 140 representative free Apps available both on Android and iOS (most popular Apps in each category). Experiments have been conducted on iOS 6.1.2 and Android 4.1.1 r6.
We manually ran applications for approximately one minute each. We could interact with some applications during this one minute duration as others required the user to log in or sign up. We did not sign up or log in as our ultimate goal was not to track the manually entered user PII but the seamless background tracking done without any user intervention/interaction. Also, we did not try to cover all possible execution paths, indeed third-party library code generally starts execution when the application is first launched.
Apart from device or operating system unique identifiers and information, we also entered other synthetic information such as addressbook, calendar events, accounts etc. This enables us to know if such data is accessed and transmitted by apps.
CROSS-APP THIRD-PARTY TRACKING
Smartphone users mostly use dedicated apps rather than websites for accessing services, essentially because of the relatively small screen size and the lack of mobile-optimized web pages (even if this later aspect has largely improved). Therefore user tracking is no longer performed only through "third-party cookies" in web browsers but also in apps through dedicated identifiers. In this section, we shed some light on this ongoing user tracking in apps through stable identifiers.
Unique identifiers from the system
First of all, let us consider the system level unique identifiers. The situation is rather different depending on the target OS.
Android.
Various system identifiers are available on Android. A user permission is required to access hardware-tied identifiers (IMEI and Wi-Fi MAC address) as well as SIM-tied identifiers (IMSI and phone number). OS-tied identifiers (Serial Number and AndroidID) identifiers are freely available to be accessed. Fig. 3a presents the number of android apps (out of a total of 140 most popular apps tested) that transmit various unique system identifiers over the Internet. We note that a significant number of apps transmit hardware-tied identifiers such as IMEI number and WiFi MAC address of the phone. IMEI number alone is transmitted by 28 apps, i.e., by 20 % apps. This is very critical in terms of user privacy because users cannot reset hardware-tied identifiers (unlike a cookie in a web browser). Android ID is the most frequently OS-tied identifier transmitted (by around 30% apps). In general, SIM-tied identifiers are the least frequently transmitted: IMSI is transmitted by five apps whereas three apps transmitted the phone number. Interestingly, we also note that most of these identifers are transmitted unmodified, i.e., without hashing or encrypting, over the Internet. This clearly demonstrates that app developers do not care at all about user privacy and the legislation is not hard enough to force the app developers to care about user privacy. Fig. 4a presents the number of servers where unique system identifiers are transmitted by 140 Android apps. The servers are classified as either first-party or third-party or unidentified. First-party servers are those where domain name conincides with the app name, third-party servers are domains of well known advertisers and trackers, and unidentified are the ones where domain name is either of content providers or ip addresses for which no hostname information is found. We note here that various unique system identifiers are transmitted to both first and third-parties. We also find that various unique identifiers are also sent to some IP addresses without any hostname information. It is not easy to identify to whom such machines belong to and why these identifiers are transmitted to them. However, we find that third-parties collect these unique identifiers more often than first-parties. In fact, depending on the app permissions, third parties try to collect as many identifiers as they can: for instance, third-party domains like ad-x.co.uk, adxtracking.com and mobilecore.com all collect and send the AndroidID, IMEI and WiFi-MAC address to their servers in clear-text. Additionally, first and third-parties both send frequently these unique identifiers over the Internet to their servers unmodified (e.g., without hashing) and in clear-text (without SSL). This is a serious threat to user privacy as a network eavesdropper can easily correlate the data flowing through the Internet. For interested raders, Table 1 in the appendix of this paper provides the whole list of servers and the corresponding unique identifiers transmitted to them by 140 Android apps in clear-text or through SSL.
Along with these unique system identifiers, third-parties also collect and send the names of apps in which their code is present. We notice that User-Agent http header field generally contains package/App name. As knowing the apps of a user reveals a lot about user interests [23] and increases the re-identification risk [24] , this is a serious privacy threat. In fact, the collection of such data is proportional to the number of apps in which third-party code is present and the number of apps sending these unique identifiers. So it is interesting to quantify the number of apps sending these unique identifiers to third-parties. Looking at both Fig. 4a and Fig. 3a , it can easily be deduced that the presence of third-parties in Android Apps is huge. Globally, we find that 31% (44 out of 140) of Apps transmit, at least, one (un)modified unique identifier over the Internet.
iOS.
Fig. 3b presents the number of iOS apps (out of a total of 140 most popular apps tested) that transmit various unique system identifiers over the Internet. The "AdIdentifier" is transmitted the most, which is fine because it has been specifically introduced for Advertizing and Analytics purposes as a replacement to the deprecated UDID. However we notice that some companies (e.g., tapjoyads.com, greystripe.com, mdotm.com, admob.com and ad-inside.com) are still using deprecated UDID. We also found four apps collecting the device name. In iOS, the device name (DeviceName) is set by the user during the initial device setup and often contains the user's real name. Since this device name is stable (the user generally does not modify it), even if it is not guaranteed to be unique across all devices, it is a stable identifer that can probably be used for tracking purposes. Additionally, if it is set with the user's real name, it may reveal user identity. We also notice that these identifiers are always collected when the user starts/stops interacting with the app. This means that third-parties can even know how long a user is using a particular app and the time when a user goes idle, revealing user habits. As, globally, 60% (i.e., 84 out of 140) of apps send, at least, one (un)modified unique identifier over the Internet, the risk in terms of privacy is huge. Fig. 4b presents the number of servers where unique system identifiers are transmitted by 140 iOS apps. We find a lot of apps transmitting AdIdentifier over the Internet to their servers as well as third-parties. UDID is still being used and transmitted by a total of 9 apps. Surprisingly, the device name is transmitted to 5 servers. Out of these 5 servers, only 1 server belongs to a first-party whereas others are either third-party or identified. In case of iOS, WiFi MAC address is the only hardware-tied identifier that is available to be accessed. It is transmitted to both first and third-parties. More details about servers where these unique identifiers are sent, can be found in Table 3 in the appendix of this paper
Unique identifiers generated by third-parties
Let us now consider unique identifiers generated by thirdparties in order to bypass OS restrictions. As access to system unique identifier is limited on iOS, third-parties generate and share unique identifiers to have a mechanism to track users across apps. However, apps are sandboxed on iOS (as well as on Android) and therefore, these third-parties cannot simply share those generated unique identifiers across apps. To circumvent this limitation on iOS, third-parties use a class called UIPasteBoard [25] . This is specifically designed for cut/copy/paste operations with the ability to share data between apps. The data shared by apps with this class can be persistently stored even across device restarts. Among the Apps we tested, we found that a large number of third-parties use the UIPasteboard class to share a unique third-party identifier across apps. Looking at the names and types of pasteboards created and the servers where these values are sent, we found that 63 Apps create at least one new pasteboard entry at the initiative of a third-party library (Fig. 3b) .
Essentially, third-party code present inside an application stores a pasteboard entry with its unique name, type and value. Later, if an App containing the code from the same third-party is installed, it retrieves the value corresponding to its pastebaord name. To have a look on pasteboard names, types and values used by various third-parties present inside 140 iOS Apps tested, please refer to Table 7 in the appendix of this paper. Here it is to be noted that user has no control over this kind of tracking and "Limit Ad Tracking" feature of iOS is ineffective in this case.
From Fig. 4b , we note that these pastboard entries are transmitted to various first and third-parties even though pastboard entries are just designed for cut/copy/paste operation between apps. Moreover, we find that pastboard entries are more transmitted to third-parties than first-parties. This assures our assumption that third-parties generate these unique pastbaord entries to track users because they transmit them over the Internet.
Comparation of third-party tracking on Android and iOS
Comparing the identifiers transmitted by 140 most popular apps on Android and iOS reveals that iOS apps transmit system identifiers more often than Android apps. However, iOS apps mostly transmit dedicated identifier, i.e., advertising id, for tracking and advertising purposes and not many apps transmit hardware-tied system identifiers as compared to app on Android. This is probably due to the fact that many system identifiers (hardware and SIM-tied identifiers like IMEI, IMSI, and Serial number) are not available to be accessed on iOS.
As opposed to iOS apps, we did not notice Android apps generating and sharing unique systems identifiers for tracking purposes. This is probably because various system identifiers are readily avaialble to be accessed by apps on Android and therefore, third-parites do not need to generate their own identifiers. Indeed, identifiers such as serial number and Android ID do not even need a permission to be accessed. As tracking through system identifiers is more reliable and accurate, trackers probably do not need to resort to this solution.
In conclusion, Android makes available wider range of system unique identifiers to apps as compared to iOS therefore it is easier for third-parties to track Android users as compared to iOS. Nevertheless, this does not stop trackers on iOS which resort to other techniques.
COLLECTION OF OTHER PERSONAL INFORMATION
To create a rich user profile, third-parties can use various means to collect a wide variety of personal information:
1. By directly collecting as much information as possible from the device (i.e., by adding the appropriate code in the libraries to be included by the app developers).
2. By retrieving it from other third-parties who have already collected this information (thereby, aggregating the user PII [26] ).
By obtaining it from first-parties.
It is difficult to measure how much information are being shared among third-parties themselves or among first and third-parties, but we next measure in this section what kinds of data and to which extent are being collected by these third-parties directly from the smartphone.
Android
Various personal data of the user is available to be accessed for apps on Android so that various useful apps can be developed. Such personal data includes, e.g., location of the user, contacts or the accounts. Our experiments with 140 Android apps reveal that different kind of user personal information is being sent over the Internet to various first and third-parties. Fig. 5a presents number of apps sending different kind of data over the Internet. We see that network code and operator name is sent by 17 and 16 apps respectively. User location and accounts information is transmitted by six and three apps respectively. Two apps transmit information related to the Wi-Fi access point they are connected to whereas one app transmit user contacts over the Internet. Fig. 6a reveal that user location is transmitted (encrypted or in clear-text) to nine third-parties whereas to three first parties. In fact, it is more often sent to third-parties than first-parties. We also find that user location is sent (encrypted or in clear-text) to nine third-parties whereas it is sent to only three first-parties. This means that user location is used more often for tracking and profiling the user and not for providing a useful service. Otherwise, we also note that the name of the telephony operator and the SIM network code is being collected by a lot of first and thirdparties (details available in Table 5 in appendix) .
Moreover, as the apps installed on a device is highly valuable information for trackers/advertisers to infer user interests and habits, we detect and measure the leakage of this information too. We find that 5 third-parties know 4 or more apps installed by a user. This puts users at serious privacy risks as users can be re-identified later with high probablity [24] . Specifically, "tardemob.com", present in "Booking.com" App, collects the list of all apps installed on the device and sends this list to its server (details available in Table 8 in appendix).
iOS
iOS also makes accessible many user PII sources (e.g., Accounts, Location, or Contacts) to apps. This is necessary so that a wide variety of apps can be developed. Figure 5b presents the number of apps sending user PII over the Internet. We find that 10 apps (out of 140) send user location over the Internet. SIM network (operator) name and SIM number are transmitted most by iOS apps. Device name is transmitted by four apps. Fig. 6b shows whether the location data it is sent to first or third-parties by these 10 apps. We find that it is sent to two third-parties (to one in clear-text and one using SSL) and three first-parties. SIM network name is mostly transmitted to third-parties (details about the transmitted user data and where it is sent to are available in Table 6 in the appendix).
Comparision between Android and iOS
We find that 10 apps (out of 140) send user location over the Internet as compared to 6 apps on Android. However, more third-parties collect and send user location over the Internet on Android. This means that on iOS, there are less third-parties but they are more broadly used by apps, on the other hand there are more third-parties in Android used by less apps. As opposed to Android, we find that iOS apps leak less user PII. In total, there are 8 (as opposed to 21 on Android) third-parties where user PII is sent to on iOS. Also, both first and third-parties did not send much data to their servers in clear-text. There is only one third-party server and one first-party server where user location is sent in clear-text on iOS as compared to six and one respectively on Android. Globally, we note that iOS apps sent lesser user PII over the Internet as they use SSL more often than their Android counterparts.
iOS apps also leak more information about the list of installed apps on the phone as compared to Android apps. Nine third-parties know, at least, five names of the installed packages. Flurry, for example, knows 25 apps installed on the phone and is included in all these apps. The included library from Flurry sends the name of the app in which it is present as part of the communication with their servers. Moreover, the collection of this information is in plain-text. To get the complete list of these third-parties as well as the package names known to them, please refer to Table 9 in the appendix of the paper. Table 2 in the appendix of this paper that presents the PII (unique identifiers and other private information) leaks reported by running the same set of applications on TaintDroid 4.3. We note that TaintDroid only reported the leakage of one unique system identifier (IMEI) whereas MobileAppScrutinator reports the leakge of six different unique identifiers. Moreover, MobileAppScrutinator overall reported more privacy leaks than TaintDroid. However, we interestingly found that both MobileAppScrutinator and TaintDroid have false negatives. This suggests that these tools should not be replacement of one another but can actually be complimentary to each other.
While comparing PII leaks reported by MobileAppScrutinator with TaintDroid, we found that TaintDroid did not report any leakage of location coordinates. TaintDroid reported leakge of Address Book (Contacts) information to two third-parties whereas MobileAppScrutinator could only detect Contacts leakge to only one party. Again it is intersting to note here that parties, where Contacts information was leaked, are mutually exclusive. TaintDroid also reported the leakage of Browser History and SMS to one and two parties respectively but, as MobileAppScrutinator did not implement their leakge detection, we cannot compare with respect to these two types of PII. On the contrary, MobileAppScrutinator was implemented to detect the leakage of other kinds of private data, such as Accounts, Operator Name, SIM Network Code and WiFi Scan/Config info, which current implementaion of TaintDroid (version 4.3) lacked.
Effectiveness of varous privacy safeguards
In order to provide transparency and control over privacy, both Android and iOS involve user decisions along with mechanisms adopted by their respective systems. However, the approach followed by Android and iOS is different: Android employs a static install-time permission system whereas iOS solicits explicit user permission at runtime. No doubt these OS mechanisms are mostly effective, they lack behavirol analysis, i.e., when, where and how often the accessed information is sent over network. For example, it is vital to distinguish the fact if the PII is sent to an application server or to a remote third-party. In fact, a user giving access to her PII for a desired service does not necessarily mean that she also wants to share this information with other parties, for example, advertisers or analytics companies. Similarly, an application accessing and sending user location only at installation time is not the same as sending it every five minutes.
Below we discuss the effectiveness of various privacy safeguards avaialabe on both Android and iOS based on our experiments and results.
Resetting the "AdIdentifier" on iOS.
The effect of resetting the AdIdentifier is not similar to "Deleting the cookies" in web tracking and could easily be nullified. Resetting the AdIdentifier, in theory, is meant to along with the AdIdentifier to third-parties (Details in Table 4 in appendix). It is noticeable that many third-parties collect this identifier, whereas it was principally designed by Apple to be used only by first-parties. As IdentifierForVendor is being collected by third-parties, they are able to link the AdIdentifiers before and after the reset.
Apps bypass the "AdIdentifier" on iOS.
We have seen that many apps are using other tracking mechanisms to track the user in addition to the AdIdentifier. In our experiments, we discovered that 93 apps out of 140 (i.e., approx. 66%) will continue to track the user after a reset of the AdIdentifier by the user. This measurement does not even consider the applications employing the previously described technique to match the changed/reset AdIdentifiers as we cannot be sure what third-parties do with their data collected. In iOS 7, Apple banned the access to WiFi MAC Address, but the percentage only reduces from 66% to approximately 42% (60 Apps out of a total of 140 Apps.), i.e., if we exclude the apps (24%) using only WiFi MAC address as a unique identifier for tracking.
"Limit Ad Tracking" iOS privacy setting.
It turns out that the "AdIdentifier" is available to all Apps, even after a user has chosen the "Limit Ad Tracking" option. It is therefore ambiguous how iOS can enforce the "Limit Ad Tracking" option. In fact, "Limit Ad Tracking" setting appear to be misleading, as it gives the end-user a wrong feeling of opting-out from device tracking. And if recently Apple started to reject apps accessing the AdIdentifier without providing In-App Advertising [27] , which is reasonable, it still does not solve the core problem.
CONCLUSION
This paper first introduces the MobileAppScrutinator platform for the study of third-party smartphone tracking. To the best of our knowledge, this platform is the first one that embraces both iOS and Android, using the same dynamic analysis methodology in both cases. For the first time, it provides in-depth insight on the different PII accessed, hashed and/or encrypted and sent to remote servers, either in clear-text or over SSL connections. This in-depth analysis capability is a key to analyze the applications and understand how they (ab)use personal information.
The second major contribution of this work is the behavioral analysis, thanks to the MobileAppScrutinator platform, of 140 free and popular apps, selected so that they are available on both mobile OSs in order to enable comparisons. Two important aspects are considered: first we show that many stable identifiers are collected on Android, in order to track individual devices in the long term. On iOS, availability of system-level identifiers is less common, but techniques have been designed to create new cross-app, stable identifiers by third-parties themselves. The second aspect concerns the user-related information. We show that a significant amount of PII is being collected by third-parties who implicitly know a lot about the user interests (e.g., by collecting the list of apps installed or currently running).
Finally, this work enables to have a comparative view of ongoing tracking on Andorid and iOS. Our experiments show that Android apps are more privacy-invasive when compared to iOS apps as the presence of third-parties is clearly more frequent in Android applications. In all cases, protective measures should be taken by device manufacturers, OS designers and various regulatory authorities in a coordinated way to control the collection and usage of PII. 
APPENDIX
